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∗

Technology’s ever-changing pace has left law enforcement
officials with the job of finding legal ways to investigate and
search suspected criminal activity. The advent of the Internet has
left these officials with a challenging landscape to navigate
regarding what is considered a search and what constitutes
probable cause to obtain a search warrant based on a suspect’s
online activity. As seen in various high-profile crimes, the
technology-savvy individual can easily disguise and misdirect the
IP addresses they use, notably when trying to hide illegal activity.
This Recent Development argues that law enforcement must tread
carefully when using Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses to obtain
search warrants for suspected criminal activity because of the
inherently unreliable information these addresses provide.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
An IP address is analogous to a phone number in that both
serve as a unique identifier for a particular device.1 Similar to how
a phone number is assigned to a telephone device, an IP address is
assigned to a specific computer.2 Furthermore, each router that a
device uses to connect to the Internet also has an IP address
assigned by the Internet Service Provider (“ISP”), comparable to
how a phone number is assigned by the phone provider.3 Just as a

1

Cale Guthrie Weissman, What Is an IP Address and What Can It Reveal
About You?, BUSINESS INSIDER: TECH INSIDER (May 18, 2015, 4:45 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/ip-address-what-they-can-reveal-about-you2015-5.
2
Weissman, supra note 1; see also What is Network Address Translation,
WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM, http://whatismyipaddress.com/nat (last visited Jan.
17, 2017) (explaining that matters become complicated when users connect all
of their devices, such as home computers, cell phones, and iPads, to a single IP
address).
3
Weissman, supra note 1. The IP address of a router is assigned by the
Internet Service Provider (ISP) who manufactured the router (for example,
Comcast or AT&T). It is difficult to identify the IP address for an individual’s
computer by looking at Internet usage; rather, the IP address an investigator
would likely locate first is that of the router, which is assigned by an ISP. Id.
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person would dial a given number to reach a specific individual,
the assigned IP address allows various devices connected to the
Internet to “talk” to each other so that data can be shared among
them.4 Each time a user visits a website, the website logs their IP
address.5 With this information, the website can keep a record of
who visits the site via tracking the IP addresses that accessed the
site, similar to how phone companies keep a log of their users’
calls.6
An IP address can be obtained easily, and various websites
offer free services to track down a desired address.7 Finding a
specific user’s IP address, however, can be more difficult and is
complicated by factors such as whether the IP address is static or
dynamic8 and whether the user was on an unsecured or secured
network.9 The ISP supplies their customers with a router and the

4

Weissman, supra note 1.
R. Kayne, Do Websites Track and Record IP Addresses?, WISEGEEK,
http://www.wisegeek.org/do-websites-track-and-record-ip-addresses.htm (last
modified Jan. 20, 2017). A website’s server sends the computer’s browser an IP
address when it “accepts” the request from the user’s computer. When the page
loads, the website often records the IP address that loads the webpage. Websites
often choose to keep a log of the IP addresses that access their site for analytical
purposes. Id.
6
Kayne, supra note 5.
7
See Amandine Markham, How to Trace an IP Address, WIKIHOW:
INTERNET SECURITY (March 2, 2015), http://www.wikihow.com/Trace-an-IPAddress (“[t]racing an IP address is fairly simple”).
8
There are two types of IP addresses: static and dynamic. Most ISPs have
moved to assigning dynamic IP addresses to their networks, which assign the
number only when users connect to the Internet, meaning the addresses change
over time. Alternatively, static IP addresses never change, and these are less
common among users. See Static vs. Dynamic IP Addresses, GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/fiber/answer/3547208?hl=en (last visited Jan. 13,
2017).
9
There are secured and unsecured networks. Anyone can access an unsecured
network because the network has no protections in place to limit access, for
example a Wi-Fi connection that requires no password. Also, because more IP
addresses are dynamic now, everyone who logs on the Internet at the local
coffee shop could potentially have the same IP address. See United States v.
Broadhurst, No. 3:11–cr–00121–MO–1, 2012 WL 5985615, at *1 (D. Or. Nov.
28, 2012) (noting that due to unsecured wireless networks, it was impossible to
5
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associated IP address, meaning the public can only identify the
router’s IP address, which oftentimes does not provide personally
identifying information because it does not identify the network
within an individual’s home.10 Therefore, this IP address is
analogous to locating the phone tower that a cell phone connected
to, rather than the actual phone used. These factors play an
important role in the reliability and specificity of information that
the IP address reveals to law enforcement officials.11
Using IP addresses can be a valuable tool for law enforcement
officials to begin their search to locate criminals through their
Internet usage, because virtually everyone uses the Internet in
some capacity. This means nearly every criminal inevitably leaves
a trail each time he or she uses the Internet. However, officials’ use
of IP addresses to obtain search warrants creates Fourth
Amendment privacy concerns, typically in the steps taken after an
IP address is known.12 In particular, Internet Service Providers,
conclude the source of child pornography file-sharing solely by using an IP
address).
10
Weissman, supra note 1. Courts have used this fact to conclude that a
search warrant is not needed to obtain a user’s IP address in the first place
because it does not lead to personally identifying information. See United States
v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, at *5 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (“When a consumer purchases a computer, takes it home,
opens it up, and turns it on, that computer does not have an IP address. Instead,
it is assigned an IP address by an internet service provider (like Time Warner)
when it connects to a particular network, and that IP address may change if the
computer connects to a different network.”).
11
See Dynamic IP vs Static IP, WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM,
http://whatismyipaddress.com/dynamic-static (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
Additionally, dynamic IP addresses make it more difficult to accurately locate
someone via their IP address because it changes. With a static IP address, geolocation services are more accurate and more expensive. Id.
12
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment concerns typically
arise in the additional steps that law enforcement officials take after obtaining an
IP address to physically locate where the defendant is. See, e.g., Acevedo-Lemus,
2016 WL 4208436, at *5 (explaining how Defendant’s assertion that the
government’s use of malware to obtain his IP address was not a Fourth
Amendment search “because an IP address is not a private physical feature of a
computer, but a commonly disclosed digital one assigned by a third party[,]”
leaving the Defendant with no subjective expectation of privacy). However,
some have found the courts’ reasoning to allow a foray into more intrusive ways
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such as Comcast and AT&T, are subject to court subpoenas to
provide personal information about their users.13 Some privacy
experts indicate that ISPs will become more reluctant to disclose
this information readily, however, because of the burgeoning
concerns about keeping customer information private.14 This
technique has become less reliable, though, as tech smart criminals
have found ways to circumvent tracking via IP address searches.15
This Recent Development argues that IP addresses alone
should not provide sufficient probable cause to obtain a search
warrant and that more substantive information should be required
to obtain IP addresses and warn that “[w]hat matters is how the government
obtain[s] the information,” calling for caution in the techniques law enforcement
uses to not only obtain IP address information, but also the steps taken after an
IP address is known. See Orin Kerr, Remotely Accessing an IP Address Inside a
Target Computer is a Search, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2016/10/07/remotely-accessing-an-ip-address-inside-a-targetcomputer-is-a-search/.
13
ISPs are subject to court subpoenas and must provide the information
requested in the subpoena. See, e.g., Privacy Policy: Information We Share,
GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/#nosharing (last visited Feb.
16, 2017) (stating in their privacy policies that Google will “share personal
information . . . [to] meet any . . . legal process or enforceable government
request.”). All ISPs are “provider[s] of electronic communication service” under
the Stored Communications Act and are therefore subject to required disclosures
upon proper governmental request. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703 (2012) (stating warrants must be issued in accordance with the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure). ISPs are ordered to disclose the subscriber’s
name, address, length of service, and source of payment for the service. See id.
§ 2703(c)(2).
14
There are growing privacy concerns of companies like Apple and Yahoo
providing user information to government officials; concerns over the policies of
ISPs are also expected to arise. See generally Our Principles, DIGITAL DUE
PROCESS, https://digitaldueprocess.org/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) (stating a
mission of “providing stronger privacy protections for communications and
associated data in response to changes in technology and new services and usage
patterns, while preserving the legal tools necessary for government agencies to
enforce the laws, respond to emergency circumstances and protect the public”).
15
This can be done through use of public Wi-Fi, the Tor network, and Virtual
Private Networks (“VPNs”). See generally Larry Greenemeier, Back to Hackers,
SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN:
TECH
(June
11,
2011),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tracking-cyber-hackers/.
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to issue a warrant. Part II provides background on the current law
governing the use of IP addresses to obtain search warrants. Part
III discusses how law enforcement officials obtain search warrants
with IP address information and explores the reliability, or lack
thereof, regarding this information. Part IV explores what
additional information should be provided, in addition to an IP
address, in order for a search warrant to be lawfully granted in a
manner that does not infringe on constitutional rights. Part V
discusses the privacy concerns with current and future methods
law enforcement officials use to obtain identifying information.
II.
BACKGROUND AND CURRENT LAW
Cyberspace crime challenges the breadth of law enforcement
investigative techniques, creating a murky line between a user’s
Fourth Amendment right to privacy16 and law enforcement’s duty
to apprehend criminals. Privacy surrounding Internet use has
presented courts with challenging questions of exactly how much
privacy users should reasonably expect when they enter cyberspace
and the methods law enforcement officials can use when finding
cyber criminals.17 Generally, federal courts have reached an
(almost) unanimous consensus that when users enter the cyber
domain, privacy rights cease to exist.18
16

U.S. CONST. amend. IV (granting citizens the right “to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures
. . . and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause”).
17
Compare United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114, 120 (3d Cir. 2014)
(holding Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
Internet signals he intentionally projected outside of his home, so the signal
sensing device that detectives used to locate him did not require a warrant), with
United States v. Croghan, No. 1:15-cr-48, 2016 WL 4992105, at *7 (S.D. Iowa
Sept. 19, 2016) (finding the Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his IP address when the government obtained it by searching his computer,
even though Defendant “lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy
in the information actually gathered”).
18
See, e.g., United States v. Broadhurst, No. 3:11–cr–00121–MO–1, 2012
WL 5985615, at *4 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2012) (“A defendant who connects to the
Internet by hijacking his neighbor’s wireless network does not have a privacy
interest in the signals coming from his house that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.”). But see Croghan, 2016 WL 4992105, at *7
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The Supreme Court has determined that one’s expectation of
privacy is a two-fold inquiry: first, a user must have a subjective
expectation of privacy; and second, society must view this
expectation as reasonable.19 When engaging in conduct on the
Internet, courts have found that “Internet users do not have
reasonable expectations of privacy in their own IP addresses or the
IP addresses of the websites they visit”20 because this information
is available to others,21 not just to law enforcement officials during
investigation.22 Due to the advent of free online services, anyone
can trace an IP address.23 Additionally, when law enforcement
officials obtain IP address information from third parties,
specifically from ISPs, courts have concluded that because users
voluntarily disclosed this information to third parties,24 there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in that information.25 The
(explaining the FBI’s search of Defendant’s computer through the use of
malware to locate his IP address was an unconstitutional search because there
was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his computer, despite
the fact he used the Internet for illegal activity).
19
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
This two-step requirement is used routinely today by courts when evaluating
expectation of privacy matters. Id. See also United States v. Bautista, 362 F.3d
584, 589 (9th Cir. 2004).
20
United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL
4208436, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016).
21
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (ruling people do not have an
expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily disclose to others).
22
See Acevedo-Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *4 (citing United States v.
Martinez, 588 F. App’x 741 (Mem.) (9th Cir. 2014) (unpublished).
23
See Markham, supra note 7.
24
United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Federal courts
have uniformly held that subscriber information provided to an internet provider
is not protected by the Fourth Amendment’s privacy expectation.”). The
information disclosed often includes name, address, phone number, and other
information that ISPs may require when registering a router for Internet service.
Comcast Legal Response Center, Law Enforcement Handbook, COMCAST 1, 14
(Rev.
May
1,
2015),
http://www.comcast.com/~/Media/403EEED5AE6F46118DDBC5F8BC436030.
ashx.
25
Acevedo-Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *4. For example, Google explicitly
states in their privacy policy terms they collect information that is used, and
often required, to create a Google Account and will share this information when
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consensus among the courts is that Internet activity, including IP
address information, is not a “private” activity that society
considers protectable under the Fourth Amendment.26 Targeted
advertisements,27 Find My iPhone,28 and other valuable location
services that people utilize every day are available because Internet
activity is not private. This has all contributed to the notion that
users should not assume a reasonable expectation of privacy in
online conduct, specifically with respect to IP addresses.29

the government properly requests it. See Privacy Policy: Information We Share,
supra note 13.
26
Acevedo-Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *4 (“Internet users have no
expectation of privacy in the . . . IP addresses of the websites they visit because
they should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet
service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing information.”)
(quoting United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007)). One
court even went so far as to recognize that “society’s view of the Internet . . . has
undergone a drastic shift[,]” changing the “corresponding expectation of
privacy” in that information. United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 618
(E.D. Va. 2016). On the contrary, defendants often argue that Internet activity
conducted inside of their home is a private activity because they are protected by
the walls of their home. See for example United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114,
120–21 (3d Cir. 2014), where Defendant attempted to use the successful defense
from Kyllo, that the home acts as a shield to keep activities conducted within the
walls from public observation, but the court declined to follow this reasoning
with respect to Internet activity. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–32
(2001).
27
Targeted advertisements are directed at individuals and are generated
through tracking technology that companies use on web sites. See Darla
Cameron, How Targeted Advertising Works, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/apps/g/page/business/how-targetedadvertising-works/412/.
28
Find My iPhone allows users to locate their phone when it is lost. When the
device is online, the phone’s location can be found using GPS technology. See
Find
My
iPhone,
ITUNES,
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/find-myiphone/id376101648?mt=8 (last visited Jan. 27, 2017).
29
United States v. Johnson, No. 15-00340-01-CR-W-GAF, 2016 WL
6136586, at *8 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 20, 2016) (finding “[Defendant] did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address because [Defendant’s]
subjective expectation of privacy simply is one that society is not prepared to
recognize as reasonable”). Interestingly, courts have begun to rely on society’s
understanding and expectation that Internet activity is no longer considered by
many to be private. See generally id. (“The concept of an interest in privacy that
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Concerns arise when law enforcement makes use of this
“public” information in a way that seems to be more invasive.30
Once police have obtained an IP address, additional steps are
usually taken to pinpoint the location of the suspected criminal.31
These additional steps are what defendants usually allege as
invasions of privacy.32 Defendants typically argue that they have a
“reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of [their]
computer,”33 and when law enforcement uses techniques that allow
them to view that content without a warrant, their Fourth
Amendment rights are violated.34 However, these additional
“invasive” steps are typically necessary for law enforcement to
obtain search warrants, because although an IP address alone will
narrow down the suspect list, it rarely leads directly to the
suspect.35 To illustrate, suppose a criminal goes to Starbucks and

society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is, by its very nature, critically
different from the mere expectation . . . that certain facts will not come to the
attention of the authorities.”) (quoting United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109,
122, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1661 (1984)).
30
See, e.g., Stanley, 735 F.3d at 116–17 (considering Fourth Amendment
implications of detective’s warrantless use of a “MoocherHunter” to locate the
suspect based on the wireless signals transmitted from his home).
31
See id.; United States v. Broadhurst, No. 3:11-cr-00121-MO-1, 2012 WL
5985615, at *1 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2012).
32
See, e.g., Broadhurst, 2012 WL 5985615, at *1 (using “the Shadow”)
(discussed infra Section III.B); Stanley, 735 F.3d at 114 (using a
“MoocherHunter”) (discussed infra Section III.B).
33
United States v. Allain, No. 15-cr-10251, 2016 WL 5660452, at *13 n.5 (D.
Mass. Sept. 29, 2016) (holding that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy
in contents on a computer).
34
See Kerr, supra note 12 (“Government access to information stored inside a
suspect’s computer without permission is a search regardless of whether the
information has been voluntarily revealed in some other way to someone else.”).
This argument was made in the Playpen cases, where the FBI sent malware to
registered computers of a child pornography website to learn their IP address,
which was obtained by looking at the contents on the user’s computer. See, e.g.,
United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL
4208436, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016).
35
See generally Hoschar v. Layne, 647 F.App’x 632, 634 (6th Cir. 2016)
(where suspect connected to a stranger’s network and the network owner was
accused and arrested for the illegal activity); United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d
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connects to an unsecured (non-password-protected) Wi-Fi network
to conduct illegal cyber activity. When this connection to an
unsecured network is made, courts have held that the defendant no
longer has a “reasonable expectation of privacy in signals he
intentionally emitted to connect to unauthorized networks.”36
Matters are further complicated when criminals use dark web
browsers37 to remain private. Dark web browsers attempt to
safeguard user’s information by allowing “users to access the
Internet in an anonymous fashion,” helping users to remain private
on the seemingly non-private web.38 The advantage of using a dark
web browser, particularly for criminal activity, is that the IP
address location is hidden, and therefore not easily ascertainable.39
However, even on a dark web browser, an IP address is still
provided when the user is on the network.40 The difference is that
these browsers will anonymize the originating user, similar to
making a private phone call where “No Caller ID” or “Blocked

114, 115–16 (3d Cir. 2014) (where IP address was traced to neighbor’s home
because suspect connected to her network).
36
Broadhurst, 2012 WL 5985615, at *5; see also Stanley, 735 F.3d at 119–20
(finding that Defendant’s conduct of sharing child pornography with other
Internet users on a stranger’s Internet connection “deliberately projected outside
of his home, as it required interactions with persons and objects beyond the
threshold of his residence.”).
37
An example is the Tor network, which is an anonymous web browser that
allows users to connect through “virtual tunnels rather than making a direct
connection,” allowing users greater privacy. Tor: Overview, TOR,
https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited Jan. 10, 2017).
38
United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 593 (E.D. Va. 2016).
39
“Although a website’s operator usually can identify visitors to his or her site
through the visitors’ Internet Protocol (‘IP’) addresses, Tor attempts to keep a
user’s IP address hidden.” Id. at 593–94 (explaining how the Tor network, a
popular dark web browser, operates). See also Tor: Overview, supra note 37
(“[i]ndividuals use Tor to keep websites from tracking them and their family
members” and to protect against Internet surveillance). A high-profile example
of a site hosted on the Tor network is The Silk Road, where users were
trafficking drugs and weapons, among other illegal activities. See Donna
Leinwand Leger, How FBI Brought Down Cyber-Underworld Site Silk Road,
USA TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/21/fbicracks-silk-road/2984921/ (last updated May 15, 2014).
40
See also Tor: Overview, supra note 37.
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Number” appears on the receiver’s phone.41 Courts have not been
persuaded by this attempt at anonymity and have found that the IP
addresses were still part of the public domain because the IP
address still needs to be disclosed to the network initially, meaning
that an individual cannot use these browsers without first revealing
his or her IP address.42 A user must still initially “disclos[e] his
identifying information to complete strangers” in order to use the
browsers, thereby “taking a significant gamble on any real
expectation of privacy under these circumstances.”43 This could be
loosely likened to a person using a Post Office (“P.O.”) Box,
where the user only reveals his personal address to the Postal
Service and provides everyone else with the P.O. Box address. The
user is actively taking steps to conceal his personal address, but in
order to do so he had to provide that address to a third party
helping him remain private.
III.
USING IP ADDRESSES TO OBTAIN SEARCH WARRANTS
Law enforcement officials use IP addresses to obtain search
warrants because IP addresses are viewed as public knowledge.44
To obtain a search warrant, law enforcement officials must present
41

Id.
United States v. Michaud, No. CR15-5351RJB 2016, WL 337263 at *7
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016) (“Although the IP addresses of users utilizing the
Tor network may not be known to websites, . . . using the Tor network does not
strip users of all anonymity, because users accessing [website at issue] must still
send and receive information, including IP addresses, through another computer,
such as an Internet Service Provider, at a specific physical location. Even though
difficult for the Government to secure that information tying the IP address to
Mr. Michaud, the IP address was public information, like an unlisted telephone
number, and eventually could have been discovered.”); see also United States v.
Johnson, No. 15-00340-01-CR-W-GAF, 2016 WL 6136586, at *3 (W.D. Mo.
Oct. 20, 2016) (“Defendant had no expectation in the privacy of his IP address,
even when using the Tor network.”).
43
United States v. Farrell, No. CR15-029RAJ, 2016 WL 705197, at *2 (W.D.
Wa. Feb. 23, 2016).
44
See generally Hoschar v. Layne, 647 F. App’x 632, 633 (6th Cir. 2016)
(where police detectives searched and arrested an innocent man based on an IP
address); United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114, 116–17 (3d Cir. 2014) (where
detective observed Internet signal strengths after investigating several suspect IP
addresses).
42
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evidence, through affidavits, as to the nature of the probable cause
for the search.45 At first, search warrants were granted after
officials presented only an IP address and information from the ISP
as probable cause, which in turn did not directly lead investigators
to the suspect.46 The identifying information provided by the ISP
typically only includes the router owner’s name, home address,
and payment information, but the router owner is often not the
person conducting the illegal activity.47 For example, when a UNC
student illegally downloads content while connected to the
University’s network, the download is traced back to the
University generally, not to the specific student. Therefore, the
University then must do additional work to identify the student or
students responsible for the activity.48 The same is true for router
owners. Consequently, router owners have had their personal
computers searched when they had no connection to the crime
other than the fact that the suspect connected to their network
router.49 This section will explore illustrative examples of how

45

The Fourth Amendment does not define “probable cause” but the Supreme
Court has reasoned that probable cause exists if the magistrate has a substantial
basis to believe there is a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.” See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238
(1983).
46
Hoschar, 647 F. App’x at 633 (where a search warrant was granted with
only IP address information).
47
For example, some of the customer information that Comcast collects is a
customer’s name, service address, billing address, e-mail address, telephone
number, driver’s license number, social security number, bank account number,
and credit card number (although “typically not all” of this information is
collected for each customer). See Comcast Customer Privacy Notice:
Disclosure,
XFINITY
(Aug.
1,
2015),
https://www.xfinity.com/Corporate/Customers/Policies/CustomerPrivacy.html#.
In Stanley, detectives subpoenaed Comcast for a subscriber’s name and home
address associated with an IP address. Stanley, 753 F.3d at 115-16.
48
Morgan Baskin, Think Twice Before Illegally DownloadingIntellectual
Property Companies are Watching You, USA TODAY COLLEGE (March 5,
2015),
http://college.usatoday.com/2015/03/05/think-twice-before-illegallydownloading-intellectual-property-companies-are-watching-you/.
49
See, e.g., Stanley, 753 F.3d at 116 (observing that the “search revealed that
none of the Neighbor’s computers contained [] child pornography”).
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police have used IP addresses and other techniques to garner more
information after knowing an IP address.
A. Illustrative Cases of Evidence Provided for Search Warrants
Law enforcement officials have frequently linked online
criminal activity with an IP address and obtained a search warrant
with this information. In United States v. Coca,50 officials searched
the defendant’s home after the investigating officer provided an
affidavit outlining the number of e-mails exchanged, the IP address
of a computer, and the name and street address associated with the
IP address from a subpoena to the ISP, Comcast.51 The defendant
challenged the issuance of the search warrant, alleging the small
amount of information offered to obtain the warrant did not
provide “a sufficient nexus that evidence of criminal activity
would be found at” his address.52 Based on his home’s location
near a college campus, he argued that the e-mail account that sent
over sixty e-mails containing child pornography was a random,
temporary user who accessed his account from a device not located
within his home.53 The court ultimately ruled that the high volume
of e-mails sent from the account, and the short period of time the
account was “inactive” before the warrant was served, gave the
magistrate information that was “more than sufficient to
demonstrate probable cause that evidence of criminal activity . . .
would be found.”54 Coca provides an example where the police
had substantive evidence in addition to the IP address to justify
issuing a search warrant. However, Coca is somewhat of an outlier
when it comes to an IP address leading to the criminal’s location.
In a rather extreme example, the property of Joyce Taylor in
Potwin, Kansas became the default IP address location for over a
decade for MaxMind, an IP address geo-location company that
maintains a database of IP address locations used by approximately

50

U.S. v. Coca, No. 14-262, 2016 WL 7013037 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2016).
Id. at 2-3.
52
Id. at 6.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 6-7.
51
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5,000 companies.55 When their database cannot identify a location,
Taylor’s home becomes the default.56 Her home has been
associated with over 600 million IP addresses, and linked to
runaway children, identity thieves, suicidal veterans, and
scammers.57 The residents alleged they have been subject to
“repeated visits and calls by law enforcement officers, at all hours
of the day and night . . . [and] private individuals have attempted to
enter their property . . . [and] access their Internet.”58 An IP
address alone has caused this Kansas home to become a “criminal
hotspot.”59
Similarly, in cases where a criminal has connected to an
unsecured network, law enforcement officials have obtained
warrants to search the home of these network owners. Oftentimes,
the network owners are not the ones who committed the crime. A
pastor in Pittsburg, Tennessee, David Hoschar, endured eighteen
months of investigations and court proceedings, including an arrest
and forced resignation from his church, because a search warrant
was granted with only IP address information.60 An investigator
discovered that images of child pornography were being
downloaded from an IP address that was traced to the pastor’s

55

See Kashmir Hill, How an Internet Mapping Glitch Turned a Random
Kansas Farm into a Digital Hell, FUSION (Apr. 10, 2016, 10:00AM),
http://fusion.net/story/287592/internet-mapping-glitch-kansas-farm/ (explaining
companies would use MaxMind’s database when, for example, they want to
identify a user who has been illegally downloading music). Some examples of
companies who use MaxMind are Facebook and Google. Id.
56
Arnold v. MaxMind, Inc., No. 16-1309-JTM, 2016 WL 6124985, at *2 (D.
Kan. Oct. 20, 2016).
57
See id.; see also Hill, supra note 55.
58
Arnold, 2016 WL 6124985, at *1.
59
Hill, supra note 55.
60
Hoschar v. Layne, 647 F. App’x 632, 632 (6th Cir. 2016) (this case was
brought by the accused pastor against the principal investigating officers for
giving false or misleading testimony to a grand jury in order to secure an
indictment). See also Pam Sohn, Sohn: Where is Justice When Justice is Done?,
TIMES
FREE
PRESS
(May
14,
2016),
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/opinion/times/story/2016/may/14/sohnwhere-justice-when-justice-done/365536/.
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home and identified as belonging to his wife.61 There was no
password on their router, and thus the network was unsecure.62 The
investigator was granted a search warrant based on the IP address
information and seized a computer and laptop from the home, of
which neither had any trace of child pornography.63 When
testifying before the grand jury, the police investigators did not
explain that the Hoschar’s router was not password protected, a
key fact given anyone in the vicinity of their home could have
downloaded the images by connecting to their network.64 These
mix-ups are not uncommon when only IP address information,
even when coupled with personal data from ISPs, is used to obtain
a search warrant.65 When technology easily provides for
anonymity, law enforcement must demand more information in
order to locate a suspect. In addition to an IP address, officials
have used devices to identify the location of suspects once an IP
address is known.
B. Police Techniques Used in Conjunction with IP Addresses
IP addresses unquestionably provide officials with a solid
starting point to trace criminal activity. However, the addresses
alone typically do not lead officials to the suspect.66 Therefore, law
61

Hoschar, 647 F. App’x at 633. This information was obtained after the ISP
was subpoenaed, specifically pointing to his wife.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 633–34. After the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation conducted an
analysis, there was no sign of any downloaded images nor evidence that it was
“scrubbed” of child pornography.
64
Id. at 634–35. The Hoschars additionally challenged that the investigators
did not present that their home was located next to a motel, which would have
led to an even larger suspect pool in addition to the unsecured router.
65
See Ansel Herz, Police Go on Fishing Expedition, Search the Home of
Seattle Privacy Activists Who Maintain Tor Network, THE STRANGER (Mar. 30,
2016,
12:56
PM),
http://www.thestranger.com/slog/2016/03/30/23885710/police-go-on-fishingexpedition-search-the-home-of-seattle-privacy-activists-who-maintain-tornetwork (commenting further that even Tor users are not immune from search
warrants based on IP addresses).
66
See Hoschar, 647 F. App’x at 633; U.S. v. Coca, 2016 WL 7013037 (W.D.
Pa. Dec. 1, 2016); Arnold v. MaxMind, Inc., 2016 WL 6124985 (D. Kan. Oct.
20, 2016).
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enforcement has developed more advanced techniques that use IP
addresses as a starting point to launch more invasive searches.67
In United States v. Broadhurst,68 detectives traced an IP
address using a signal-locating device known as the Shadow.69 A
detective discovered that child pornography photographs were
being shared on a peer-to-peer network70 and traced the source to a
particular neighborhood after identifying ten IP addresses that were
sharing the photographs.71 After subpoenaing the ISPs for the ten
IP addresses, the search was narrowed down to six addresses in the
neighborhood; but, once again, the addresses were accessed
through an unsecured wireless network.72 Knowing that unsecured
networks lead to a much larger suspect range, the detective
employed the Shadow device to narrow down the suspect pool.73
The Shadow works by scanning the area for radio signals emitted
by station devices (e.g., computers) and access points (e.g.,
wireless routers) that allow the devices to connect to each other,
facilitating an Internet connection.74 By observing the signal
strength, the operator can know if the station device or access point
67

United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
29, 2016).
68
United States v. Broadhurst, 2012 WL 5985615 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2012).
69
The Shadow is a device that allows the user to observe and locate wireless
access points (mechanisms, like routers, that allow wireless devices to connect
to that network) and station devices (computers, tablets, smart phones) by
receiving radio signals within the immediate area of the device. Id. at *2–3.
70
A Peer-to-Peer (“P2P”) network allows users to share files among
themselves by connecting directly to another computer, providing an
anonymized route of the traffic. See, e.g., Margaret Rouse, Peer-to-Peer (P2P),
TECHTARGET:
SEARCHNETWORKING,
http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/definition/peer-to-peer (last updated
Aug. 2014). When users are on a P2P network, a “peer” can search for files
being shared on the network and download ones of interest. Broadhurst, 2012
WL 5985615, at *12 n.1. Popular examples of P2P networks are Napster and
BitTorrent.
71
Broadhurst, 2012 WL 5985615, at *1.
72
Id. (explaining that because users were accessing the photographs on an
unsecured network, anyone could theoretically access the network as long as
they were in the wireless range).
73
Id. at *2-3.
74
Id.
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is close.75 In Broadhurst, as in other cases, it was determined that
the router owner was not involved after their home was searched.
However, when detectives used the Shadow while walking in the
vicinity of the other suspected addresses, one address had a high
signal spike that indicated the suspect was there.76 A search
warrant was then obtained based on the information gathered using
the Shadow.77
The defendant argued that, before the Shadow could be used,
law enforcement needed to first obtain a warrant because
monitoring the signals emitted from his device constituted a Fourth
Amendment search.78 He argued he had a constitutional right to
privacy in the signals that the device analyzed.79 The federal court
rejected this argument because the defendant, through his use of
another’s network, voluntarily disclosed his IP address information
to third parties.80 The Broadhurst court, agreeing with the Sixth
Circuit, reasoned that “[w]hen criminals use modern technological
devices to carry out criminal acts and to reduce the possibility of
detection, they can hardly complain when the police take
advantage of the inherent characteristics of those very devices to
catch them.”81
75

Id. Because the Shadow requires the user to select access points or station
devices to observe, the user must have an idea of whom they wish to observe. In
this case, the detective walked around the addresses in question with the device
and observed the signal strength at each address to gather information. Id.
76
Id. at *3.
77
Broadhurst, 2012 WL 5985615, at *4.
78
Id. Defendant alleged it “intruded upon a constitutionally protected privacy
interest” in the signals. Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. The court recognized a nuance when defendants use a third party’s
unsecured network to avoid detection. “On the one hand, [the] defendant would
serendipitously receive Fourth Amendment protection because he hijacked
another person’s Internet connection to share child pornography files. On the
other hand, another individual who uses his own Internet connection to share the
same files lacks such protection, merely because the IP addresses would track
back to his house . . . . [T]he court should not recognize an expectation of
privacy in one case simply because one individual uses a hijacked wireless
signal.” Id. at *5.
81
Id. at *5 (quoting United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 774 (6th Cir.
2012)).
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With an almost identical fact pattern to Broadhurst, the
Pennsylvania Police Department in United States v. Stanley82 used
a “MoocherHunter” to locate the person suspected of downloading
child pornography.83 The detective discovered the user on a P2P
network,84 found the IP address and subpoenaed the ISP for
identifying information.85 Detectives then searched the router
owner’s home, ultimately finding no evidence of child
pornography but discovering that the router was not passwordprotected.86 The detective left a police computer in the neighbor’s
home connected to the router and was able to observe the suspect
downloading the illegal images and obtain the suspect’s IP and
MAC address.87 Without a search warrant,88 the detective was able
to see when Stanley was sharing images and was able to identify
Stanley’s IP address because the neighbor allowed the detective to
observe who was connecting to his router.89 Once the detective
knew the IP address, he used the “MoocherHunter” and determined
Stanley’s apartment was the suspected place of the illegal

82

United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 115. The “MoocherHunter” is mobile tracking software, much like the
Shadow device, that measures the signal strength of the radio waves emitted
from the mooching device. The signal strength increases when the device is
pointed towards where the mooching device is located. Id. at 116. The device is
called the “MoocherHunter” because it is used to find those who are
“mooching” off another person’s wireless router. Id. at 115.
84
See supra explanation in note 70.
85
Id. at 115–16.
86
Id. at 116.
87
Id. This information would have been available to anyone who was
connected to the wireless router at that time. Id. A MAC (Media Access
Control) address is assigned to network hardware adapters assigned by the
provider. See What Is a MAC Address, WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM,
http://whatismyipaddress.com/mac-address (last visited March 3, 2017).
88
Notably, the detective contacted the United States Attorney before
proceeding with their investigation to inquire whether a search warrant was
needed. They “discussed the practical impossibility of obtaining a search
warrant without knowing which one of the many nearby residences the signal
was being transmitted from,” and concluded that a warrant was not needed.
Stanley, 753 F.3d at 117.
89
Id. at 116.
83
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activity.90 With this information, the detective obtained a search
warrant for Stanley’s home, finding 144 images and videos
classified as child pornography.91 As seen in Hoschar, where
strangers were connecting to the pastor’s unsecured network, the
same was true in Stanley.92 Stanley was able to connect to his
neighbor’s unsecured network in an attempt to avoid detection.93
The detective in Stanley, however, was able to provide more
substantive evidence to obtain a search warrant after using the
MoocherHunter.94 This additional information was needed to
accurately determine that Stanley was the suspect.95 Consequently,
this type of information should be required in search warrants
where the IP address associated with the router does not belong to
the criminal.
IV.
WHAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN SEARCH WARRANTS
As seen in the illustrative cases in Section III.B, searches
conducted with information only obtained from a user’s IP address
narrow the suspect list down to virtually anyone, anywhere, with
access to a given network at a given time. The ability to narrow
down the suspect list, often to a specific neighborhood or street, is
undoubtedly helpful information. Therefore, this information—
when coupled with other techniques—can be lawfully utilized to
gather substantive evidence before seeking a search warrant. It is
evident that courts do not consider the wireless devices that law
enforcement officials have used to be an illegal search under the
Fourth Amendment. However, as technology and the techniques
used to locate criminals become more advanced , an intrusion
90

Id. at 117.
Id.
92
Id.
93
Stanley, 753 F.3d at 117.
94
See id. The detective knew the MAC address of the suspect because of the
computer left at the neighbor’s house to observe who was connecting to the
network, and the MoocherHunter then confirmed that the wireless signals
connecting to the network were emitted from Stanley’s apartment. This
additional investigation was needed after the IP address of the router was known
to lead to the suspect. Id.
95
Id.
91
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further and further into people’s privacy is on the horizon. One
such current technique includes sending malware to computers,
which is viewed as more intrusive than using a device that reads
wireless signals.96 This section will discuss factors that law
enforcement officials should consider to ensure probable cause is
established before seeking a search warrant. The privacy concerns
implicated by vague search warrants, oftentimes including only IP
address information, will also be explored. This includes how ISPs
respond to subpoenas and the potential for greater resistance from
ISPs moving forward.
A. Further Investigation Should be Conducted to Meet the
Probable Cause Standard
Given the unreliable nature of an IP address when used to
pinpoint the exact suspect in a crime, law enforcement officials
should conduct a more thorough investigation before seeking a
search warrant. The Fourth Amendment does not define what is
required to establish probable cause before a search warrant is
issued, but the Supreme Court has reasoned probable cause is
found when “there is a fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.”97 An IP address simply does
not meet this probable cause standard because, as seen in Section
III, the IP address often leads to an innocent home where a
criminal has been connecting to a network.98
i.

Unsecured Networks
In addition to receiving information from the user’s ISP, one of
the most important facts officers should determine is whether the
network is secured or not.99 Unsecured networks should be a red

96

See, e.g., United States v. Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *2 (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 28, 2016) (describing the FBI’s use of a Network Investigative Technique
(“NIT”) that sent malware to users that, when downloaded, sent identifying
information back to the FBI, including the user’s IP address).
97
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
98
See, e.g., Hoschar v. Layne, 647 F. App’x 632, 633 (6th Cir. 2016).
99
For instance, in Hoschar, a claim of malicious prosecution was brought
against the detectives because they neglected to testify before the grand jury that
the wrongfully accused had an unsecured Wi-Fi network, meaning that anyone
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flag to investigators because they leave open a large pool of
suspects. Anyone within the wireless range can connect, meaning
suspects can look for unsecured networks to use as a shield for
their physical location,100 as seen in Section III. Therefore, a search
of the router owner’s home should not be conducted without more
corroborating information pointing to them as a suspect.101
Even on a secured network, it can be relatively simple for some
users to hack into password-protected Wi-Fi, leading to a larger
suspect pool even when secured networks are identified.102 Router
within range could connect to the network. The detectives were ultimately
protected by immunity. Id. at 635–37.
100
Interestingly, the Third Circuit hinted in United States v. Stanley that simply
connecting to an open Wi-Fi network may itself be a criminal act. Stanley, 753
F.3d at 120 (“The presence of Stanley’s unauthorized signal was itself
‘wrongful.’”). The court reasoned that Stanley “essentially hijacked his
[n]eighbor’s router, forcing it to relay data to Comcast’s modem and back to his
computer, all without either the [n]eighbor’s or Comcast’s knowledge or
consent,” acting as a “virtual trespasser.” Id. The judge even went so far as to
cite several state statutes that have “criminalized unauthorized access to a
computer network.” Id. at n.10. While this issue was not the focus of the
opinion, it has raised privacy concerns because the neighbor intentionally left
their Wi-Fi open (or at least neglected to set a password) so it is difficult to see
this act as a theft or trespass. See TechDirt, Appeals Court Says Using Open
WiFi May Be a Crime, ABOVE THE LAW (June 13, 2014, 10:08AM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2014/06/appeals-court-says-using-open-wifi-may-be-acrime/ (stating it is “quite troubling” to have this language in an appeals court
ruling).
101
See Stanley, 753 F.3d at 116, for an example of good evidence of
corroborating information. The officer used the MoocherHunter after knowing
Defendant’s name, home address, and the MAC address of the suspected
computer, and had evidence that the defendant was connected to the suspected
network. This information was obtained because the router owner allowed the
officer to set up a police computer in their home that was connected to the
network Stanley was accessing. This allowed the officer to observe who
connected to the network and link the activity to Stanley. If the router owner had
refused, detectives would have presumably had greater difficulty in locating
Stanley. See also U.S. v. Coca, 2016 WL 7013037 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2016).
102
“For example, hacking is much more prevalent now than it was even nine
years ago, and the rise of computer hacking via the Internet has changed the
public’s reasonable expectations of privacy . . . . Now, it seems unreasonable to
think that a computer connected to the Web is immune from invasion. Indeed,
the opposite holds true: in today’s digital world, it appears to be a virtual
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passwords that are assigned by the ISP are found on the back of the
device, and unless a user changes that password, anyone with
access to that device can obtain the password.103 The ease with
which a criminal can access a stranger’s Wi-Fi network in an
attempt to avoid detection leads to the conclusion that further
investigation is needed for search warrants.104 Devices such as the
Shadow and the MoocherHunter can be employed to gather further
information and, in conjunction with the router’s location, pinpoint
a suspect.105
ii.

Additional Devices
Courts have allowed law enforcement to use devices like the
Shadow and MoocherHunter without a search warrant, and until a
court declares them unlawful to use without a search warrant,106
these mobile geo-location tools will be helpful. These devices
measure signal strength, which in turn helps locate where the
signal is originating from, and, as it stands today, there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in these transmissions.107
Defendants argue that using these devices is like looking inside
their home to view their activity.108 The government, on the other

certainty that computers accessing the Internet can—and eventually will—be
hacked.” United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 619 (E.D. Va. 2016). See
also Aseem Kishore, Prevent Someone Else from Using Your Wireless Internet
Connection, ONLINE TECH TIPS (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.online-techtips.com/computer-tips/secure-wireless-connection/ (“Many people assume that
setting a strong WiFi password is all they need, but this is not [the] case.”).
103
See Kishore, supra note 102. The author warns against keeping the long
passwords that are assigned from the ISPs, often found on the device itself,
because anyone “can still gain access by simply copying the password printed
on your wireless router, since most people don’t change the default password set
by their ISP.” Id.
104
Aaron Mackey, Seth Schoen & Cindy Cohn, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
Unreliable Informants: IP Addresses, Digital Tips and Police Raids 11 (Sept.
2016),
https://www.eff.org/files/2016/09/22/2016.09.20_final_formatted_ip_address_w
hite_paper_0.pdf.
105
See supra Section III.B.
106
See infra Section V.A.
107
United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114, 114 (3d Cir. 2014).
108
Id. at 117–18.
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hand, explains that these signals are being sent outside the home
and therefore are no longer private information.109 Likewise, no
content on their devices is being searched or intercepted with these
devices; solely their Internet signal is identified.110 Additionally,
the police must have identified a radius of where the suspected
user is before employing the device, meaning some preliminary
search has been conducted prior to locating signals.111
The National Institute of Justice also lists several tools for
police to use, such as the Cantenna (a Wi-Fi detector) and the Air
Magnet.112 Other experts urge police to search chat rooms, such as
Reddit,113 in specific subgroups where the suspects may be likely
to post about their crimes or provide tips for others on how to do

109

Id. at 119 (explaining that Defendant projected his Internet signals outside
of his home to connect to his neighbor’s network, therefore creating no
reasonable expectation of privacy).
110
Id.
111
See United States v. Broadhurst, 2012 WL 5985615, at *1–2 (D. Or. Nov.
28, 2012) The deputy identified ten suspect IP addresses in a neighborhood and
the ISP subpoenas revealed that theses addresses were registered to six home
residences in the neighborhood. With this information, the deputy used a signal
reading device to observe when the IP addresses at these residences were
accessing the website to share illegal content. Id.
112
A cantenna is used to extend the range of a wireless network or
detect/intercept other wireless networks in the region. A Wi-Fi detector is used
to locate wireless network signals. An Air Magnet monitors networks by
intercepting or detecting signals. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Investigative Uses
of Technology: Devices, Tools, and Techniques 44 (Oct. 2007),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/213030.pdf (Each device is designed to
“locate or intercept wireless communications from . . . computer networks.”).
An explanatory scenario provided in the report explains how law enforcement
identified an offender who was “illegally accessing the wireless hotspot of a
local business in an effort to obtain anonymous Internet access” by turning down
the signal strength of the network and observing a person who moved closer and
closer to the building to remain connected, which led them to apprehend the
offender. Id. at 46.
113
Reddit is a website that allows users to post links and stories for others to
see and comment. “Subreddits” are individual communities for specific topics.
See What is Reddit?, REDDIT HELP https://reddit.zendesk.com/hc/enus/articles/204511479-What-is-Reddit- (last visited Mar. 19, 2017).
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the same.114 For a less invasive way to track criminals using the
dark web, officials can check IP addresses with a list of Tor exit
relays115 on ExoneraTor.116 If the IP address is also used as a Tor
exit relay, then the IP owner is likely not a suspect.117 If a warrant
application is still sought, this information should be included and
explained so the court can determine if there is probable cause.
Unfortunately, the dark web is a tricky place and new techniques
will need to be used for proper searches.
The use of these devices will likely remain controversial as
cyber savvy criminals create new techniques to avoid detection.
Concerns will continue to arise over whether the devices are an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy and if new devices intrude
further into private lives, thus constituting a Fourth Amendment
violation.
B. ISP Subpoenas
As seen above, investigators must subpoena the ISP after
identifying an IP address to locate the owner of the router.118
Because the IP address obtained is that of the Internet router, not
the actual device,119 this information can only marginally narrow
their broad list of suspects. With non-password protected Wi-Fi,
free Internet connections, and savvy Internet users able to hack
114

See Alan Woodward, Viewpoint: How Hackers are Caught Out by Law
Enforcers, BBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology17302656 (recounting how one hacker was discovered by law enforcement).
115
Mackey, Schoen & Cohn, supra note 104, at 18. “An exit relay is the final
relay that Tor traffic passes through before it reaches its destination.” What Is a
Tor Relay?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/torchallenge/what-istor.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
116
ExoneraTor is a database of all Tor exit relays. Mackey, Schoen & Cohn,
supra note 104, at 18.
117
Id. (explaining that Tor exit relays are hosted by volunteers, therefore
preserving anonymity).
118
See supra Section III.
119
Routers can be located anywhere and can be accessible to the public if the
connection is through an unsecured network or the router is in a public place,
such as a coffee shop or airport. See What Is a Router?,
WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM, http://whatismyipaddress.com/router (last visited
Mar. 26, 2017).

340

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 18: 316

into private Internet connections, more information is needed to
justify a lawful search. As seen, police have searched incorrect
homes and disrupted families, accusing loved ones of downloading
child pornography, all because an unforeseeable criminal
connected to their internet network.120 This is problematic because
connecting to available wireless networks is common and devices
often locate these available networks automatically.121 When the
neighborhood gossip catches wind of the reasons police visited a
home, rumors will spread and potentially tarnish their reputation.
In the case of the pastor in Tennessee, rumors ruined eighteen
months of his life with a false arrest on child pornography charges
and forced his resignation from the church.122 The potential
disruption, coupled with growing privacy concerns and distrust of
law enforcement nationwide, could lead to a movement for a
change in ISP policies that calls for greater protection of user
data.123

120

See Hoschar v. Layne, 647 F. App’x 632 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Stanley, 753 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Broadhurst, 2012 WL
5985615 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2012).
121
See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 112 (explaining that Windows
operating systems can be configured to automatically scan for wireless
networks).
122
Hoschar, 647 F. App’x at 634.
123
See Whitney Gibson, VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR, & PEASE LLP, Subpoena
Guide for Identifying Anonymous Internet Poster 6, n.1 (2014),
http://internetdefamationblog.wp.lexblogs.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/297/2014/07/Supoena-Guide-for-Identifying-AnonymousInternet-Posters.pdf; see, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) (explaining that ISPs that
also provide cable services (Comcast, AT&T, TWC) are subject to the Cable
Privacy Act, which prohibits these entities from releasing any personally
identifying customer information without a court order), but see H.R. 1981,
112th Cong. (2011). This proposed bill passed a House vote in 2011 but was
never enacted into law. The Bill’s stated purpose was to aid in enforcing child
exploitation laws by requiring ISPs to retain twelve months of logs of
customers’ names, credit card information, and other identifying information. Id.
This was thought by some privacy activists to allow law enforcement officials to
identify a user’s personal habits, along with a fairly detailed picture of where
they were each day. Id.
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i.

Privacy Concerns with ISP Subpoenas
A move towards greater privacy protection took place when the
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) passed “Protecting
the Privacy of Customers of Broadband Data and Other
Telecommunications Services in 2016,” aimed at protecting users’
personal data.124 This rule restricts what user information can be
sold, shared, or traded with third parties, for example,
advertisers.125 However, subpoenas carry more weight than third
parties buying the information for advertising purposes, and the
FCC rule does not address law enforcement issues.126 ISPs must
respond to a subpoena, and there is little a user can do when his or
her information is being hunted.127 More likely than not, a
subscriber will not know their ISP received a subpoena for their
information until after the information has been surrendered
because consent is not needed to provide this to law
enforcement.128 This is of great concern to users whose
information is being subpoenaed without their knowledge because
they often do not know they are being investigated until police
come knocking at their door with a search warrant.129 If
124

This rule was enacted on November 2, 2016 to “adopt a framework that
provides heightened protections for sensitive customer information” because of
the wide range of information broadband providers are able to obtain now. FCC
Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other
Telecommunications Services, 47 C.F.R. § 64.2 (2016). The rule requires
carriers to “obtain customers’ opt-in approval for use and sharing of sensitive
customer [personal information] . . . [and] opt-out approval for the use and
sharing of non-sensitive customer [personal information.]” Id. at 5. For an
example of the opt-in opt-out policies, see AT&T Privacy Policy: Your Rights &
Choices, AT&T, http://about.att.com/sites/privacy_policy/rights_choices (last
visited Feb. 19, 2017).
125
Kate Cox, FCC Adopts New Privacy Rule Limiting What ISPs Can Do
With Your Personal Data, CONSUMERIST (Oct. 27. 2016, 10:42 AM),
https://consumerist.com/2016/10/27/fcc-adopts-new-privacy-rule-limiting-whatisps-can-do-with-your-personal-data/.
126
47 C.F.R. § 64 (2016).
127
Frequently Asked Questions for Subpoena Targets, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/pages/frequently-asked-questions-subpoenatargets#prevent_disclosure (last visited Jan. 10, 2017).
128
See, e.g., Privacy Policy: Information We Share, supra note 13.
129
See Frequently Asked Questions for Subpoena Targets, supra note 127.
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notification is received, the subscriber can file a motion to quash
the subpoena, however, aside from this request, nothing else can be
done.130 This creates privacy concerns for users and ISPs who want
their subscribers to feel secure in sharing their information.
Notably, the new FCC chairman under President Trump’s
administration has already begun moves to undo key aspects of the
recently enacted FCC rule, creating uncertainty for privacy
regulations moving forward because of the amount of customer
information that could be shared between ISPs, web browsers, and
companies seeking to buy customer data.131 The more people who
have access to this information, the easier it may become to
misidentify suspected criminals using only IP address information.
The FCC’s rule, though, as enacted in 2016, serves as a strong
indicator that the federal government is beginning to respond to
users’ demands for greater privacy protection of their data.132
There are also time limits on how long ISPs keep data that law
enforcement officials will find valuable, such as what websites a
user visits, along with the time and date of the visit.133 Given the
sheer volume of data, most providers keep these records for only
six to nine months.134 Consequently, law enforcement officials
must act relatively quickly when they identify a potential suspect,
possibly leading to a hurried investigation to obtain a search

130

Id.
Jeff Dunn, Republicans Are Moving To Kill Rules That’d Make Internet
Providers Get Your Consent Before Selling Your Web Browsing Data, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Mar. 9, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-congress-mayoverturn-obama-internet-privacy-rules-2017-3.
132
Jon Brodkin, FCC Imposes ISP Privacy Rules and Takes Aim at
Mandatory Arbitration, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 27, 2016 12:17 PM),
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/10/isps-will-soon-have-toask-you-before-sharing-private-data-with-advertisers/. But, ISPs are not happy
about this and law enforcement officials would likely not be either if it makes
their investigations more difficult.
133
Alex Wawro, FAQ: Will Your ISP Protect Your Privacy?, PCWORLD (Oct.
11,
2016,
6:00
PM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/241591/faq_will_your_isp_protect_your_privac
y_.html.
134
See Gibson, supra note 123, at n.1.
131

APRIL 2017]Tracking Criminals with Internet Protocol Addresses 343
warrant prior to the information being deleted.135 Police need to
reconcile the desire to move quickly and the necessity to ensure
rights are not violated. Search warrants should not be granted when
only an IP address and information from the ISP is known, because
this does not provide specific enough identifying information. It is
therefore important for law enforcement officials to have other
techniques in place to corroborate information beyond an IP
address, which is public information.
ii.

ISPs Begin to Push Back
ISPs have begun to implement data protection policies to
ensure subscribers that their information is not being sold or
accessed without their permission.136 As it stands, ISPs are under
no obligation to retain user’s data, such as Internet browsing
history, for any period of time.137 This creates problems for law
enforcement officials when they seek information about an IP
address that was used beyond what the ISP has in storage.138 For
example, Comcast stores IP address information for 180 days and
states in their Retention Policy that if they are asked for identifying
information “used more than 180 days prior to receipt of the
request, Comcast will not have information to provide.”139 There
are two potential explanations for this: (1) ISPs do not have the
135

See, e.g., United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 563 (3d Cir. 2010) (“By
the time government agents got the IP addresses [of the suspects], there was not
enough time to subpoena customer identities from the ISPs before the ISPs had
purged their records reflecting which IP addresses had been assigned to which
customers.”). It was not until the FBI gained administrator-level access to the
child pornography website that they were able to obtain the IP addresses of
those posting and viewing illegal content.
136
FCC Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other
Telecommunications Services, 47 C.F.R. § 64.4 (2016) (explaining the new
FCC rule requires broadband providers to have opt-in approval from customers
to share personal information and “material retroactive changes” must be made
to privacy policies to reflect the this).
137
Ernesto Van der Sar, How Long Does Your ISP Store IP-Address Logs?,
TORRENTFREAK (June 29, 2012), https://torrentfreak.com/how-long-does-yourisp-store-ip-address-logs-120629/.
138
Comcast Legal Response Center, Law Enforcement Handbook: Retention
Policies, supra note 24.
139
Id.
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storage capacity to retain all this customer data for extended
periods of time, so they must purge it frequently,140 or (2) ISPs are
beginning to make small moves towards greater protection of
customer’s data. These greater protections include frequently
deleting this information, similar to an individual clearing his or
her browsing history.141 Both of these are probable explanations.
Given the amount of data that ISPs receive daily, it is not feasible
to maintain storage for long periods.142 Moreover, after notable
cases such as the FBI’s feud with Apple143 and Yahoo,144 ISPs
have come under scrutiny from customers that companies are not
adequately protecting their data.145
It is a bit worrisome to leave power in the hands of ISPs to rewrite data privacy rules because law enforcement has a vested
interest in being able to access identifying information of
suspected criminals. Users can “spoof” their IP address to re-route
to another address,146 and ISPs similarly allow users to obtain new

140

See Gibson, supra note 123, at n.1.
See 47 C.F.R. § 64 (evidencing that ISPs will be required by law to ensure
some customer data remains private through opt-in and opt-out rules).
142
While there are no data retention laws in the United States, ISPs generally
do not retain customer data for long periods. Some worry this would create a
large source of private data that would be enticing to hackers and accidental
disclosures. See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., Mandatory Data Retention,
https://www.eff.org/issues/mandatory-data-retention (last visited Mar. 2, 2017).
143
Arash Khamooshi, Breaking Down Apple’s iPhone Fight with the U.S.
Government,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
21,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/03/technology/apple-iphone-fbifight-explained.html.
144
Andy Greenberg, How Did The Feds Get Past Yahoo’s Encryption?
Yahoo!,
WIRED
(Oct.
4,
2016,
5:56
pm),
https://www.wired.com/2016/10/yahoo-spy-scandal-shows-encryption-failswithout-backbone/.
145
FCC Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other
Telecommunications Services, 47 C.F.R. § 64.3 (2016) (explaining this
regulation was enacted in response to users’ requests for increased protection of
their data, specifically in regards to selling customer data).
146
“Spoofing” is used to disguise IP addresses by re-routing through those
trying to determine where the router is to another computer or by providing a
false IP address. See In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises
Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 759 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
141
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IP addresses when they desire.147 This is similar to clearing your
browsing history to remove any Internet searches that may point
towards evidence of illegal activity. These methods of concealing
identities harm both the ISPs and the government because ISPs use
customers’ history logs to improve browsing capabilities, provide
relevant advertisements, and make other improvements.148 This
also harms government officials because it severely complicates
their ability to track criminals online.149 A workable solution must
include compromises on both sides.
But, what other options could ISPs provide to their customers
to help them feel secure that their privacy is being protected? It
will go beyond fighting the government’s desire to have a
backdoor into ISP’s records.150 An FCC rule enacted in 2016
allows users to opt-in and opt-out of sharing certain data, showing
the possibility that ISPs may request more information from the
government when they receive subpoenas for customer
information.151 While the rule did not affect law enforcement
147

How to Change Your IP Address, WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM,
http://whatismyipaddress.com/change-ip (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
148
See Privacy Policy: How We Use Information We Collect, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/#infouse (last visited Feb. 16, 2017).
149
See, e.g., United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 563 (3d Cir. 2010)
(where the government was unable to receive information from an ISP
because the ISP had already purged the data).
150
The geopolitical climate and national security concerns will prevent ISPs
from allowing United States law enforcement officials to have a backdoor
mechanism into their software, precisely so that they will not have to allow other
foreign governments to do the same. See Khamooshi, supra note 143
(contending that if Apple allowed the United States government to overcome the
encryption then they would be hard pressed to deny other countries, such as
China, the same access).
151
But see FCC, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Ajit Pai on
Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other
Telecommunications
Services,
(Nov.
2,
2016)
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-148A1.pdf,
where,
interestingly, the new head of the FCC strongly dissented in the adoption of this
Rule. Pai’s strongest criticism of the Rule is that ISPs are now subject to stricter
regulations than edge providers, such as Google and Yahoo, who are regulated
by the Federal Trade Commission. Id. at 209. He disagrees with the FCC’s
justification that ISPs need greater regulation because they have access to a
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issues, if search warrants continue to be granted based on IP
address information only, it is likely that ISPs will begin to
question the probable cause associated with the subpoenas more
often.152 If tension occurs between law enforcement and ISPs, ISPs
could begin to request more information from officials or alert
customers before they disclose the information sought. This
inevitably lengthens the process of receiving information from the
ISPs and government officials then run the risk of the data being
automatically purged during the discourse. Without that data, the
government will presumably lose a large portion of its evidence
against the suspect.153
“vast sea” of customer data, while edge providers only see a “slice” of this data.
Id. at 210. This could be a sign that ISPs, moving forward, will not be subject to
further regulations that allow customers greater control over how their data is
being used. This certainly guarantees a fight between privacy activists and the
FCC over how to treat this data, leading to belief that a regulatory alternative
may not be politically feasible. Notably, a few months after its enactment, the
Senate voted to overturn the Rule. See Chris Mills, ISPs Can Now Sell Your
Browsing History Without Permission, Thanks to the Senate, BGR (Mar. 23,
2017, 1:42PM), http://bgr.com/2017/03/23/fcc-privacy-rules-senate-overturnedajit-pai/.
152
See infra Section V.B.
153
See United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 563 (3d Cir. 2010) (where the
FBI was unable to subpoena the ISP for customer information because the ISPs
no longer had that data saved). A similar situation arose in the Tenth Circuit,
notably in a decision authored by Supreme Court nominee Neil Gorsuch, that
found the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children’s (“NCMEC”)
action of opening e-mails forwarded to them by AOL was an unconstitutional
search under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d
1292, 1304–07 (10th Cir. 2016). Judge Gorsuch’s decision rested on the fact that
this was a “warrantless opening and examination of (presumptively) private
correspondence” that the Fourth Amendment protects. Id. at 1307. The NCMEC
is a government entity that receives and investigates tips about possible child
trafficking instances, and AOL forwarded a user’s e-mail that they suspected
contained illegal content. (AOL noticed certain hashes in the e-mail that had
been previously associated with child pornography photographs.) The NCMEC
opened the attachment to determine if the e-mail had illegal images, which it
did. The Tenth Circuit found that NCMEC needed to obtain a warrant before
they could open the attachments, which seems to put NCMEC’s ability to
investigate at a disadvantage and could hinder the efficiency and effectiveness
of their work. Interview by Steven Baker, Steptoe Cyberlaw Podcast: Interview
with Jason Healey, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP (Feb. 6, 2017)
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V.
INVASION OF PRIVACY CONCERNS
Some of the current investigative tools law enforcement
officials use raise privacy concerns. Some courts espouse the
viewpoint that “[l]aw enforcement cannot afford to be hamstrung
by technologically creative criminals,”154 conceivably suggesting
that greater deference will be given to investigative techniques
regardless of privacy intrusions. This section presents the privacy
concerns created by signal monitoring devices, as seen in Section
III, and analyzes a new malware technique used by the FBI to
obtain IP addresses that edges closer towards an unconstitutional
search under the Fourth Amendment.
A. Concerns with Signal Monitoring Devices
First, defendants have alleged that use of signal devices like the
Shadow and MoocherHunter is an invasion into a user’s private
home.155 While the government tends to view suspects who use a
stranger’s Wi-Fi network without permission as “virtual
trespassers,” the defendants generally make the argument that the
government is trespassing into their private home.156 The oft-cited
case to support the idea that signal monitoring is an invasion is
Kyllo v. United States,157 where officers parked across the street

(http://www.steptoecyberblog.com/2017/02/06/steptoe-cyberlaw-podcastinterview-with-jason-healey-2/). This important decision evidences at least one
circuit’s, and a potential Supreme Court Justice’s, willingness “to be skeptical
about government authority.” Id.
154
United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL
4208436, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (reasoning this especially applies
“when what is at risk is the sexual exploitation and sadistic abuse of children”).
This reasoning could also lead to prejudicial views by courts depending on what
the crime is. In Acevedo-Lemus, the judge suggested that “the unspeakable harm
caused by child pornography” was a large factor in the ultimate decision to deny
suppression of the evidence obtained using the NIT, whereas other courts have
allowed suppression of this evidence. Id.
155
See generally United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114, 118-19 (3d Cir.
2014) (explaining Stanley alleged an unconstitutional search occurred when the
detective “used the MoocherHunter to trace Stanley’s wireless signal back to the
interior of his home”).
156
Id. at 120.
157
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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and used a thermal imager to determine the existence of a
marijuana growing operation inside the residence.158 The scanner
showed that certain parts of the defendant’s home were unusually
warm, leading officers to conclude that high-powered lamps used
to grow marijuana were inside.159 The Supreme Court declared
“obtaining [information] by sense-enhancing technology . . . [from
the] interior of the home that could not otherwise have been
obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area[] constitutes a search,” and therefore the search
inside Kyllo’s home was unconstitutional.160
While this seemingly bright-line rule that use of “senseenhancing technology” is unconstitutional without a search
warrant, the rules have changed when it comes to Internet activity
because these signals are projected outside the home. Kyllo’s
reasoning has not been persuasive in court given the growing belief
that IP addresses are not private information and the steps
necessary to connect to the Internet are not private. This argument
is also unlikely to be convincing in the future because courts have
routinely used a nuance in Scalia’s opinion regarding sensing
technology to defend law enforcement’s use of these devices —
“without physical intrusion.”161
Moreover, defendants often claim that their criminal activities
were conducted within their home, purposefully shielded from the
public eye, and should be protected from this type of “search.”162

158

Id. at 29–30.
Id.
160
Id. at 34 (internal citations omitted).
161
Compare Stanley, 753 F.3d at 119 (where court upheld use of signal
monitoring device to detect Internet signals) with Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (where
court found use of sense-enhancing technology to obtain information that would
otherwise have only been obtainable through physical intrusion into the home
was unconstitutional).
162
Stanley, 753 F.3d at 119 (“In effect, Stanley opened his window and
extended an invisible, virtual arm across the street to the Neighbor’s router so
that he could exploit his Internet connection. In so doing, Stanley deliberately
ventured beyond the privacy protections of the home, and thus, beyond the safe
harbor provided by Kyllo.”). But see United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292,
1307 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that the NCMEC conducted an unconstitutional
159
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Courts have found that intentionally sending out Internet signals in
search of a network connection makes these signals public.163
Additionally, many of the crimes that are conducted on the Internet
involve file sharing, which requires projecting not only network
signals outside of the home, but also interactions with third
parties.164 These interactions lessen the legitimacy of claims to
privacy. It seems that using a computer inside of your home to
conduct Internet activity is not enough to insulate a user from law
enforcement officials and other monitoring of one’s online
conduct.
These conclusions seem in accordance with the Supreme
Court’s precedent in Kyllo, but it raises the question of where the
line is drawn for law enforcement officials to gather information
that otherwise could not be viewed “without physical intrusion.”
Courts are slow to adapt to the rapidly changing technological
world, and lawyers likewise are not well equipped, nor do they
have the time and resources, to fully account for the changing
landscape of the Internet.165 The precedent thus far gives law
enforcement a broad use of power to “peer inside” a user’s home
by monitoring signals that, by their very nature, must be projected
outside the confines of the private home to conduct activity on the
Internet. As these investigations become more intrusive due to the
prevailing view that Internet activity is not private, defendants and
privacy advocates worry about the future of online privacy.

search when they opened previously unopened e-mails forwarded to them by
AOL that contained child pornography photographs).
163
United States v. Broadhurst, No. 3:11-CR-00121-MO-1, 2012 WL
5985615, at *5 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2012) (“[D]efendant voluntarily sent out a
signal to amplify access point signals and attach to third parties’ networks with
his computer.”).
164
Stanley, 753 F.3d at 119-20 (“Stanley made no effort to confine his
conduct to the interior of his home. [H]is conduct—sharing child pornography
with other Internet users via a stranger’s Internet connection—was deliberately
projected outside of his home, as it required interactions with persons and
objects beyond the threshold of his residence.”).
165
Mackey, Schoen & Cohn, supra note 104.
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B. Concerns with Future Techniques
Criminals have turned to the dark web to evade detection from
law enforcement’s signal monitoring.166 Matters inevitably become
more complicated when criminals use the dark web to intentionally
remain anonymous, leading officials to use techniques that test the
limits of Fourth Amendment privacy protections.167 A sampling of
the main privacy concerns that have arisen involve (i) government
searches of computers through hacking techniques involving
malware and (ii) magistrate judges issuing warrants that are
executed nationwide, outside the district in which they were
granted.
i.

Government “Hacking”
An explanatory example of what the FBI recently did to
circumvent this so-called anonymity on the dark web can be seen
in the nationwide Playpen cases.168 A child pornography site
known as Playpen was hosted and used on the Tor network169
where users were anonymous.170 After receiving a tip from a

166

Tor: Overview, supra note 37.
These issues include government “hacking,” whether a search was
conducted on the suspect’s computer to retrieve information, and debate about
whether the search warrant particularly described the place to be searched. See
generally Orin Kerr, Government ‘Hacking’ and the Playpen Search Warrant,
WASH.
POST:
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Sept.
27,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2016/09/27/government-hacking-and-the-playpen-searchwarrant/.
168
See generally United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 612 (E.D. Va.
2016).
169
See generally Untied States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC,
2016 WL 4208436, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016). The Tor network, and other
dark web browsers, operate differently than ordinary websites that log the IP
addresses of visitors after they visit the site. To access the Tor network, “a user
must first download and install particular software, which subsequently shields
the user’s IP address by relaying it among ‘nodes’—computers run by
volunteers all over the world. When a user visits a website located on the Tor
network . . . his actual IP address is not shown. Instead, [the site] can only see
the IP address of the Tor ‘exit node’ – the final relay computer which sent the
user’s communication to [the site].” Id.
170
Id. at *1-2.
167
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foreign informant of the host’s IP address, the FBI located the host
and used his connection to infiltrate the computers of the other
anonymous users.171 The FBI used a “Network Investigative
Technique” (“NIT”) to send malware to users who accessed the
website by running the site for a short period of time.172 Once the
user logged into the site and downloaded content, the malware was
subsequently downloaded with the selected image.173 This malware
allowed the FBI to obtain IP addresses of users and later obtain
home addresses after subpoenaing their ISP.174 Federal courts
across the nation have declared the use of the NIT was legal,
despite vocal privacy advocates who have declared this was an
illegal search and seizure.175
Defendants who were subject to the FBI’s NIT allege that by
sending them the malware to identify their IP addresses, the FBI
conducted a Fourth Amendment search of their device because the
malware was programmed to “search” their computer for this
information.176 This is an important assertion that most courts who
heard these cases tended to brush aside.177 It is well established
that users do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
IP address because invariably they disclose it at least once to
access the web.178 The NIT created a different situation though.
While the Tor users disclosed their IP address to the first node
host, the FBI did not obtain the userss IP address from those hosts,
or from the ISP as was done in the cases in Section III.179 This is
an important distinction because, rather than subpoenaing the third
party for the IP address, the FBI obtained the IP address only after
they installed a program on the suspect’s computer that then

171

Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *2-4.
173
Id. at *2.
174
Id. at *5.
175
Acevedo-Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *4.
176
Id. at *5.
177
See generally id.
178
Tor: Overview, supra note 37.
179
United States v. Allain, 2016 WL 5660452, at *13 n.5 (D. Mass. Sept. 29,
2016).
172
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searched through the computer for the address.180 Therefore, the
FBI searched the contents of the suspects’ computers.181 Some
courts have said that the initial disclosure of the IP address to the
first node renders the address non-private information.182
Therefore, it does not matter how the FBI obtained this non-private
information, even if it involved a warrantless search.183 The initial
disclosure is all that matters to render a warrant unnecessary.184
Once law enforcement officials can “search” computers for
specific information without a warrant, whether it is private
information or not, there is no telling how far this broad grant of
power could extend.185

180

Id. (“The FBI’s search not only implicated defendant’s privacy interest in
his IP address, but also in his computer.”).
181
Id.; but see Acevedo-Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *6.
182
United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL
4208436, at *4 (C.D. Cal, Aug. 8, 2016).
183
Acevedo-Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *6 (“[A] necessary aspect of Tor is
the initial transmission of a user’s IP address to a third-party—the operator of
the initial Tor node—and the fact that a user’s IP address is subsequently
bounced from node to node within the Tor network to mask his identity does not
alter the analysis of whether he had an actual expectation of privacy in that IP
address, which he had initially disclosed to a stranger.”) (internal citations
omitted); but see Kerr, Government ‘Hacking’, supra note 165 (arguing that Tor
users do not voluntarily share their IP addresses with the websites they visit, and
so it does not matter that obtaining an IP address in other situations would not be
a search, it was a search in these cases because it was the “absence of voluntarily
sharing . . . [that] led the government to surreptitiously obtain the information
using the NIT” in the first place).
184
Acevedo-Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *6.
185
See In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958
F. Supp. 2d 753, 755 (S.D. Tex. 2013). The court denied a warrant request to
install software designed to extract certain stored electronic records and generate
photographs and location information over a thirty-day period, which amounted
to simply “a warrant to hack a computer suspected of criminal use.” The
government failed to assure the court that only information of the suspected
criminals would be gathered and did not address various concerns such as
whether the suspects used public computers, whether it belonged to family
members who were not involved in the illegal scheme, whether a counterfeit
address was being used, and whether the e-mail address was accessed on more
than one computer. Id. at 759-60. Additionally, “[s]ome privacy advocates and
analysts worry that in doing so, investigators may also wind up hacking and
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On the one hand, this type of “hacking” may be necessary in
the world of the dark web where criminals go to great lengths to
remain undetected.186 One court dealing with the Tor network
stated, “the government should be able to use the most advanced
technological means to overcome criminal activity that is
conducted in secret.”187 However, the steps government officials
have already taken seem to be pushing the limit. What if the FBI,
in addition to searching for the IP address, was also able to access
credit card information, social security numbers, and other
personally identifying information from their “search” of the
suspect’s computer? As the NIT was used, personally identifying
information was not searched for per se, and so the suspects’
names and addresses were obtained from a subpoena to the ISP
associated with the IP address found using the malware.188 It is not
difficult to imagine a situation where law enforcement could easily
program the malware to search for even one piece of identifying
information, such as to obtain access to passwords the suspect used
for various sites. In one Playpen case, the FBI filed for voluntary
dismissal of charges against the Defendant because they did not
want to reveal the details of the malware they used to hack into the

identifying the computers of law-abiding people who are seeking to remain
anonymous, people who can also include political dissidents and journalists.”
Ellen Nakashima, This Is How the Government is Catching People Who Use
Child Porn Sites, WASH. POST: NATIONAL SECURITY (Jan. 21, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-the-governmentis-using-malware-to-ensnare-child-porn-users/2016/01/21/fb8ab5f8-bec0-11e583d4-42e3bceea902_story.html.
186
Nakashima, supra note 185 (“Without using the hacking technique,
officials said, it would be very difficult to locate pedophiles who go to great
lengths to hide their tracks.”).
187
Acevedo-Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *6 (quoting United States v.
Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 621 (E.D. Va. 2016)).
188
Id. at *2. But see United States v. Croghan, 2016 WL 4992105, at *7 (S.D.
Iowa Sept. 19, 2016) (explaining the judge found defendants had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the location where the IP address was stored;
therefore, the government needed a valid search warrant to obtain this
information directly from their home computers, despite the fact that defendants
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information that was
gathered).
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Tor network during discovery.189 This seems to create problems for
both parties involved as the public would like to know what
techniques law enforcement is using, but there is also an interest in
keeping some aspects private so criminals cannot surpass detection
techniques. The more access law enforcement has to private
information without a warrant, the closer they move towards
conducting an unconstitutional search.
On the other hand, if law enforcement officials are not able to
obtain this information using malware (or another similar method),
they may turn to third parties who are able get the information,190
granting access to this information to more parties in addition to
law enforcement. For example, the FBI enlisted the help of a thirdparty company when Apple refused to unlock the phone of the
suspect in the San Bernardino attack.191 Privacy experts have been
vocal about preventing any “back door” mechanism for the
government to bypass encryption and password protection
methods, fearing that this will allow the government to have
unfettered access to information.192 In the changing cyber world,
courts are struggling to address the interconnectivity of all users.
Using malware is a direct way courts allow law enforcement to
access criminals online, but a procedurally important aspect has
risen to the surface as well: the territorial reach of warrants for
searching Internet activity.
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ii.
Legality of Warrants for All Users on a Website with Illegal
Content
The other main issue in the Playpen cases dealt with the
legality of the warrant issued to use the NIT.193 A magistrate judge
in the Eastern District of Virginia issued a warrant, but the
malware was used—via downloading by users on the website—all
across the country.194 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41, a magistrate judge “has authority to issue a warrant to search
for and seize a person or property located within the district.”195
The FBI allowed the malware to be downloaded on thousands of
computers outside the Eastern District of Virginia, outside the
legally admissible jurisdiction.196 Some courts found the warrant
was valid, despite users being outside the Eastern District of
Virginia, reasoning that the users made “a virtual trip via the
Internet to Virginia” putting them within the reach of the warrant
to be a legal search.197 This is a broad construction of the warrant’s
jurisdiction and a view not all courts have been ready to follow.198
Other courts found the NIT being downloaded outside the
Eastern District of Virginia was a Rule 41 violation.199 As a result,
these courts were compelled to suppress the evidence found using
the NIT because it violated the Fourth Amendment.200 Even though
193

Croghan, 2016 WL 4992105, at *2 (“The Court notes that the NIT Warrant
at issue in this case has resulted in a great deal of litigation across the country.
The numerous district courts to consider motions similar to the present Motions
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*5 (holding that the government’s NIT warrant violated Federal Rule of
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Eastern District of Virginia); United States v. Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *6
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016) (finding the NIT warrant “technically violates the
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the government argued that “suppression [was] too extreme a
remedy” and undoubtedly was a “victory” for the defendant who
illegally downloaded child pornography, the court found the
evidence obtained in the violation was simply too prejudicial to be
admissible.201 The IP addresses of defendants would not have been
obtained but for the malware being sent outside of the magistrate’s
jurisdiction. The government often argues that this is a ministerial
violation, but courts have found this to be a procedural violation
that involved “substantial judicial authority.”202 In essence, “the
magistrate judge lacked authority, and thus jurisdiction” to issue
the warrant, rendering it invalid.203
The disagreement regarding jurisdictional limits of search
warrants for information regarding technological devices poses a
problem because defendants who were subject to the same search
warrant from accessing the same website are being treated
differently across the nation, raising judicial uncertainty for
defendants. Recently, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure was amended to address these concerns.204 The
amendments allow a magistrate judge “to issue a warrant to use
remote access to search electronic storage media and to seize or
copy electronically stored information located within or outside
that district if . . . the media . . . has been concealed through
technological means [] or . . . [is] located in five or more
districts.”205 These amendments establish the NIT warrant was
valid because the rule allows warrants to reach beyond the
jurisdiction where they are issued. However, even though courts
prior to these amendments acknowledged that a “potent
investigative technique” such as the NIT could someday be
authorized under Rule 41, the privacy rights of individuals must
still be respected with the “extremely intrusive nature of such a
201
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(adopted December 16, 2016).
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search.”206 As a clear standard of what law enforcement officials
can do in online searches is being established, it is important that
Fourth Amendment privacy concerns are protected.
VI.
CONCLUSION
IP addresses are useful for locating criminals and provide a
stepping-stone for launching subsequent investigations.
Nevertheless, judges should persist to request more specific
information before granting search warrants. With the advent of
freely available information regarding users’ online conduct, it is
not unduly burdensome for officials to obtain additional
information to support pending searches. With an IP address, for
example, officials can first subpoena the ISP for customer
information which can then be used to corroborate a suspect’s
online identity. From there, signal monitoring devices can be used
to observe where the suspected online conduct originates. These
additional steps are necessary to ensure proper judicial prudence
when conducting new investigations.
As techniques become more intrusive, both officials and users
must be wary about privacy concerns. Users must take extra steps
to ensure their networks are secured and should actively check to
see if any unauthorized users are accessing their network.
Additionally, law enforcement officials carry a heavy burden
themselves and must tread carefully so as not to cross into
unconstitutional search territory. IP addresses do not always
provide concrete details about a suspect’s identity, so caution
should be used when invasive techniques are used to obtain a
suspect’s IP address. As seen in cases where criminals use dark
web browsers, IP addresses can easily be relayed among various
different computers across the country or can be re-routed to
another device. Officials should be hesitant to use invasive
techniques to obtain this information, as it could prove fruitless to
their search, particularly given some courts’ decisions to suppress
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evidence because legal procedures were not followed.207 Similarly,
if officials successfully bring charges against a suspect but are
compelled to reveal specific details about their search techniques,
they may choose to dismiss the criminal charges against the
suspect, rather than have to reveal their method.208 These concerns,
among others, are shaping a new landscape for investigating
criminal activity online. IP addresses alone should not provide
sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant given their
unreliable nature.
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